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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DARRELL DEVERE POULSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 




The defendant and appellant will be referred to as 
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will be referred 
to as the State. References to the record will be desig-
nated "R.", and references to the separate transcript 
will be designated "T." 
A complaint was filed on September 20, 1961, 
charging the defendant with the crime of murder in the 
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first degree. The preliminary hearing was held October 
3, 1961, and defendant was bound over to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah (R. 3, 4). On October 27, 1961, a Notice of 
Proposed Defense of Insanity was filed, and a plea of 
not guilty was entered ( R. 13) . The case was tried 
before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett commencing on 
the lith day of December, 1961. A verdict finding the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree was 
returned on December 14, 1961 (R. 107). No recom-
mendation of leniency was made by the jury. There-
after, an appeal was taken to this Court from the judg-
ment of the District Court in denying the defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial (R. 117). 
Counsel for the defendant at the trial were Phillip 
V. Christenson, Esquire, and M. Dayle Jeffs, Esquire, 
both of whom were appointed by the Court. Counsel 
on appeal did not participate in the trial of the pro-
ceedings or the subsequent motion for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimonial evidence offered by the State con-
sists principally and materially of the following: Mr. 
Darlo Sawyer, a resident of American Fork, Utah, 
testified that he sought the services of Karen Mechling 
to watch his children on the evening of September 16, 
1961 (T. 191); that he saw her for the last time at 7:30 
p.m. that evening (T. 192); that he returned to his 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
residence at 2:30 a.m., on the morning of the 17th, and 
found a caulking gun in a chair and noticed "four or 
five" drops of blood on the floor (T. 193); and, that 
the following morning Karen Mechling's body was 
found in a vacant lot adjacent to the Sawyer residence 
(T. 196-7). 
Medical evidence offered by Guy A. Richards, 
M.D., tended to establish that the victim had been dead 
for several hours at the time of his examination shortly 
after 7:00 a.m., on the morning of September 17, 1962, 
but could not fix the time of death ( T. 226-229) . 
An autopsy was performed by Wilford H. Le-
Cheminant, M.D., who testified, in substance, that 
lesions were present on the victim's head, face, hands, 
fingers, shoulders and legs ( T. 232-3) ; that the vaginal 
area was torn (T. 233); that there was a skull fracture 
( T. 234) ; that "there were several lesions that could 
in themselves account for the death * * * ;" that the 
skull fracture "could account for her death" ( T. 235) "; 
that "less than five minutes" elapsed between the blow 
to the cranium and the time of death; that semen was 
present in the vagina ( T. 237-8) . 
A statement of the defendant was received in evi-
dence ( T. 253) as Exhibit 15. In substance; the de-
fendant admitted entering the home, striking the girl 
and subsequently having relations with her. 
_.. The defendant's case consisted of evidence tending 
to establish the defense of insanity, as presented by his 
plea. Deputy Utah County Sheriff, Art Harold Child, 
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testified that on the Saturday evening, prior to the 
offense, that he had questioned the defendant in con-
nection with an earlier attack upon another girl with 
a piece of iron ( T. 288-301). The defendant admitted 
striking at the girl while she was riding a bicycle, but 
that he was frightened away by a ~an who witnessed 
the attack. The witness then related the following state-
ment by the defendant: "He told me that when he 
would get this feeling [a desire for sexual relations] 
he would usually go window peeking and build this up 
to a certain pitch, and after he had built himself up to 
a certain pitch, he sometimes would have to attack the 
girl or have relations with the girl and he didn't think 
there was any better way other than this way" (T. 294-
5). The offense charged in the instant case was com-
mitted the same evening that the defendant was ques-
tioned and then released by Deputy Sheriff Child. 
Mr. Lynn Hanks, Principal of the Springville 
Junior High School, testified on behalf of the defend-
ant, as follows: That he was the custodian of the elemen-
tary school records of the defendant; that Defendant's 
Exhibit 21 was the permanent student record of de-
fendant for the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, grades, reflecting 
his attendance and marks (T. 314-5). 
Mr. A. LeRoy Erickson, Principal of the Grant 
Elementary School which was attended by the defend-
ant, identified Defendant's Exhibit 23, a 6th grade 
report of defendant's intellectual, physical, emotional, 
aesthetic, social and reverent behavior (T. 319-327). 
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The former Chief Probation Officer of the Third 
District Juvenile Court, Mr. Roy Passey, identified 
Defendant's Exhibit 24 as a card from the files of the 
probation office pertaining to the defendant and de-
scribing_, inter alia, "mauling over women on street" on 
December 8, 1954, and "sexual attack on half sister" 
on April27, 1955, the latter resulting in his commitment 
to the American Fork Training School by the District 
Court. The Court refused to admit into evidence De-
fendant's Exhibit 27 for identification, which purported 
to be an Order of Commitment to the Utah State Train-
ing School, and related pleadings. 
Vernon F. Huston, M.D., Superintendent and 
Medical Director of the Utah State Training School 
at American Fork, identified Defendant's Exhibit 28, 
a history of the defendant's confinement at the institu-
tion ( T. 338-9) . The exhibit is a summary of incidents 
at the institution relating to the defendant, including 
the date of commitment, June 22, 1955, and the date 
of discharge, August 8, 1958. Dr. Huston advised that 
a vasectomy operation was performed on the defendant 
on August 7, 1957, to sterilize him (T. 340). 
Mark K. Allen, professor of psychology at Brig-
ham Young University and clinical consultant for the 
Utah State Training School testified that he conducted 
two psychological examinations on the defendant in 
1955 and 1956 (T. 353-4); and that at the time of 
said examinations the defendant "was a mentally de-
ficient person with some personality difficulties along 
with it" (T. 354). 
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· Ij a Korner, Chief of the section of Psychology 
and Associate Professor of Psychiatry in the Medical 
School of the University of Utah, testified as follows: 
That he examined the defendant in November, 1961, 
with respect to his "mental capacities" (T. 363); that 
using the verbal part of the Wechsler Bellvue Test the 
defendant had an I.Q. of 67, "which would put him in 
what you would call the feeble-minded range" (T. 
364) ; that "I came to the opinion that it (finding with 
respect to the defendant] could be explained* * *that 
mental illness is very frequently in specific cases of this 
kind, namely, from very early childhood on * * * " 
(T. 365); that between 30 and 40 percent of all indi-
viduals who are at the present time in institutions arid 
held to be feeble-minded, actually are not feeble-minded, 
but are mentally ill" ( T. 366), that "In my opinion 
the feeblemindedness is related to a condition of mental 
illness (T. 367); that his mental illness is illustrated 
by the fallowing testimony: 
"Knowledge is usually used to help us in deal-
ing with problems. Intelligence is used to help 
us deal with problems. Of course, it means that 
we are capable of using the intelligence. And 
from the testing, and I would like to stress the 
fact I am functioning as a psychologist, basing 
my opinion on tests from the test data I have, the 
impression-it is my opinion that the little, the 
little the defendant has in terms of intelligence 
is useless when he is under the impact of an 
emotional strain, under any kind of emotional 
impact. In such situation we are capable of kind 
of holding our emotions back, or kind of post-
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paning them, or talking to ourselves. In such 
instances the Mr. Poulson has nothing available 
to help him stem whatever he is in. He resembles 
at that time a human being without a head, with-
out a brain. He would not be much different 
from an animal in such instances. He has not got 
the use of these faculties in such a situation." 
(T. 368); 
that the defendant, "once launched, launched on an 
impulse, whatever it is on, something which stirs him 
up, once launched upon that he has no built-in mecha-
nism in his machine, so to speak, which can stop him 
from completing the act. * * * in him there is very 
little difference between thinking, talking, and doing. 
* * * I don't think he knows whether he thinks some-
thing, whether he does it, or whether he has talked about 
it" (T. 373); and, on redirect examination, that the 
defendant's response to the Rorschach Test was "very 
deviant statistically speaking" ( T. 399). 
In rebuttal the State introduced the testimony of 
Mr. Dennis I. Greenwood, a psychologist at the Utah 
State Hospital, who characterized the defendant as 
a "mild" mental deficient (T. 413). Carl Kivler, M.D., 
a medical physician in charge of the mentally retarded 
unit at the Utah State Hospital, testified that he had 
examined the defendant on several occasions ( T. 420) ; 
that he diagnosed the defendant as "mentally retarded 
in a degree as mild" (T. 421); that the defendant "knew 
the difference between right and wrong" at the time 
of the offense (T. 423); that he "understood the nature 
and the consequences of his act" (T. 423); that he 
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found no evidence of psychosis (T. 424); that the de-
fendant "has an unrestrained sexual drive" and is 
"sane" (T. 428). On cross examination Dr. Kivler 
agreed that a person could be "mentally ill" without 
having "delusions" (T. 430-1). 
Louis G. Moench, M.D., a Salt Lake City psy-
chiatrist, having examined the defendant prior to trial, 
testified as a rebuttal witness that the defendant was 
"mildly mentally retarded" (T (. 435) ; that he is suf-
fering from no psychosis (T. 436); that the defendant, 
on the night of the incident had "an understanding of 
the difference between right and wrong" ( T. 437) ; 
and in response to a hypothetical question posed by the 
prosecutor, that the defendant had control of his im-
pulses on the night of the offense ( T. 438) . 
ARGUlVIENT 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT TO THE JURY WERE ERRONEOUS 
AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTAN-
TIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN 
THAT THE JURY WAS CHARGED THAT 
IT MUST EITHER FIND THE DEFENDANT 
GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DE-
GREE OR ACQUIT THE DEFENDANT. 
Among its instructions to the jury, the trial court 
charged as follows: 
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"No. 15: Although there are two degrees of 
murder, the evidence in this case is such that 
either the defendant is innocent of the charges 
of murder, or he is guilty of murder in the first 
degree" ( T. 445). 
It is submitted that the foregoing instruction did 
not properly reflect the alternatives which the jury 
should have been given by virtue of the evidence pre-
sented at the trial. This instruction followed a charge 
to the jury that "the defendant has raised the issue of 
his sanity at the time of the alleged offense" (T. 443}. 
Other material instructions bearing upon this issue 
were in relation to the elements of "felony murder," 
as follows: 
"No. 4 : The essential elements of the crime 
of murder in the first degree as charged in the 
information are as follows: 
( 1) That the defendant, Darrell Devere Poul-
son, killed Karen Mechling on or about the 17th 
day of September, 1961, at Utah County, Utah. 
( 2) That the killing of Karen Mechling was 
committed in the perpetration of the crime of 
rape or burglary by the defendant. 
( 3) That the said killing was felonious. 
( 4) That the said Karen Mechling died with-
in a year and a day after the cause of death was 
administered. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each 
and all of the above elements of the offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to con-
vict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
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evidence has failed to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt one or more of said elements, then 
you should find the defendant not guilty. 
No. 5: Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought. 
No. 6: Murder which is committed in the per-
petration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a rape or 
burglary is murder in the first degree. 
No.7: Rape insofar as its definition applies to 
the facts in this case is an act of sexual inter-
course accomplished with a female, not the wife 
of the perpetrator, when the female is under the 
age of thirteen years. Likewise, it is rape when 
the act of sexual intercourse is accomplished 
with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator, 
when she is at the time unconscious of the nature 
of the act, and this is known to the accused. 
The offense of rape is a felony. 
No. 8: The statutes of this States provide that 
any person who forceably breaks and enters, or 
who without force enters an open door, window, 
or other aperature of any house, room, apart-
ment or tenement with intent to commit larceny 
or any felony is guilty of burglary. One who 
enters a place such as those mentioned above 
with the specific intent to commit larcency or 
any other felony is guilty of burglary, regard-
less of whether the intent is thereafter carried 
out. 
No. 9: The word "felonious" as used in these 
instructions means performing an act with an 
evil heart or purpose, or acting with a deliberate 
intention to commit a crime" (T. 441-3). 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. FAILUR.E TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE MENTAL CONDITION OF 
THE DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF THE 
ALLEGED OFFENSE MAY AFFECT HIS 
ABILITY TO ENTERTAIN A SPECIFIC 
INTENT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME 
CHARGED CONSTITUTES MATERIAL 
AND SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE TO 
THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT. 
Significantly, the jury was presented with two 
alternative choices in order to find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree. According to the instruc-
tions the jury could convict, as charged, provided they 
found that the killing was "committed in a perpetration 
of or attempt to perpetrate, a rape or burglary ... " 
(T. 442; italics supplied). Moreover, the jury was 
instructed to find that the "killing was felonious" 
(T. 442), the word "felonious" being defined as "per-
forming an act with an evil heart or purpose, or acting 
with deliberate intention to commit a crime." 
Burglary is likewise given a complete definition, 
with particular emphasis upon the "specific intent" 
essential to that crime. 
That burglary requires a specific intent is well 
established (Roberts v. State, 136 Tex. Ap. 138, 124 
S.W. 2d 128; Hooks v. State, 145 Tenn. 43, 389 S.W. 
529). As stated in Simpson v. State~ 81 Fla. 292, 87 
So. 920 ( 1921), " ... The mere breaking and entering 
a dwelling house is not a fact from which may be in-
11 
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ferred that the accused intended to commit rape or 
murder," the court concluding there must be a specific 
intent (See 9 Am. J ur., Burglary §§ 26, 49). 
B. THE POSTURE OF THE EVIDENCE 
BEARING UPON THE MENTAL CONDI-
TION OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE 
TIME OF THE OFFENSE IS SUCH AS TO 
REQUIRE THAT THE JURY BE IN-
STRUCTED THAT IT MUST FIND BE-
YOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE DE-
FENDANT DID NOT AFFECT HIS ABIL-
ITY TO ENTERTAIN A SPECIFIC IN-
TENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME 
CHARGED. 
The evidence bearing upon the mental condition of 
the defendant at the time of the alleged offense, assum-
ing it not to be sufficient to excuse the defendant from 
culpability altogether, is of sufficient posture to present 
to the jury an issue as to whether the defendant could 
entertain a specific intent to commit the crime charged. 
This evidence would require the court to instruct the 
jury on lesser included offenses not involving a specific 
intent, or not involving the state of mind and intention 
essential to first degree murder. 
The evidence presented on behalf of the defendant 
bears primarily upon the issue of sanity or mental con-
dition. That the killing occurred in the manner de-
scribed by the prosecution cannot be denied, and no 
12 
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Issue is made here upon that score. Substantial evi-
dence of mental impairment was offered by the defense, 
and it is worthwhile to summarize the picture presented. 
The testimony reflects that the defendant had an I.Q. 
of 67, "which would put him in what you would call 
the feeble-minded range" ( T. 364) ; "that mental illness 
is very frequently in specific cases of this kind, namely, 
from very early childhood on ... " (T. 365); that 
"feeble-mindedness is related to a condition of mental 
illness" (T. 367); that the defendant's response to the 
Rorschach Test was "very deviant statistically speak-
ing" ( T. 399) ; that the defendant "was a mentally 
deficient person with some personality difficulties along 
with it" (T. 364); that the defendant was confined to 
Utah State Training School at American Fork, and 
that a vasectomy operation was performed on the de-
fendant on August 7, 1957, to sterilize him (T. 340); 
that the defendant's juvenile court record reflected a 
history of "mauling over women on street," and a "sex-
ual attack on half sister" (Defendant Exhibit 24) ; 
that on the very evening of the commission of the prin-
cipal offense the defendant had been questioned by a 
deputy county sheriff in connection with an earlier 
attack upon another girl with a piece of iron (T. 288-
301) ; and, according to an expert witness on behalf 
of the defendant, "once launched, launched on an im-
pulse, whatever it is on, something which stirs him up, 
once launched upon that he has no built-in mechanism 
in his machine, so to speak, which can stop him from 
completing the act .... In him there is very little differ-
13 
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ence between thinking, talking, and doing .... I don't 
think he knows whether he thinks something, whether 
he does it ,or whether he has talked about it" (T. 373). 
The prosecution witnesses characterized the defendant 
as a "mild" mental deficient (T. 413); that the defend-
ant "has an unrestrained sexual drive" and that a person 
could be "mentally ill" without having "illusions" ( T. 
430-1) 0 
It is submitted that the evidence bearing upon 
mental condition, including feeble-mindedness could 
affect the ability of defendant to entertain the specific 
intent essential to the crime of burglary ("specific 
intent to commit larceny or any other felony"), or 
"felonious" killing. We are not unmindful of those 
Utah decisions which assert the general proposition 
that where a killing takes place in the perpetration of 
a felony it is "murder in the first degree and can be 
nothing else" (State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d 
801; see also State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 
Pac. 362, and State v. Oblizala, 60 Utah 47, 205 Pac. 
739) . These cases are distinguishable as no issue of 
mental condition was presented for consideration. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in two notable deci-
sions has formulated the view that a mental condition 
falling short of "legal insanity" may impair the mind 
of the accused sufficiently to warrant the jury in finding 
that he could not entertain the intent essential to the 
greater crime, and thus the degree of the crime must 
be reduced to that offense which does not involve a 
14 
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specific intent (State v. Green (August 27, 1931), 6 
P.2d 177; State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 
1071). These cases are land-mark decisions and are 
frequently given considerable attention by jurists and 
others interested in the development of the relationship 
between crime and mental responsibility. In the Green 
case, this Honorable Court made the following observa-
tion: 
"While an accused is not entirely relieved from 
the responsibility for the commission of a crime 
on account of insanity unless the insanity be of 
such a nature and degrq.e that he did know the 
nature or quality of his acts, or that he did not 
know the act was wrong, or that his mind was 
so impaired by the deed that he was unable to 
control his act, nevertheless a mental disease 
falling short of these effects may, where a par-
ticular intent is a necessary element of a higher 
degree of a crime~ have the elf ect of reducing the 
degree of such crime.n (Italics supplied.) 
The Anselmo case involved a first degree murder 
conviction, where evidence that the defendant was an 
epileptic and had been drinking heavily caused our 
Supreme Court to reverse upon the following rationale: 
"While the jury found his condition in that 
respect was not such as to affect his mental capa-
city to relieve him from responsibility, yet it may 
have been such as to affect his mental capacity 
to cruelly deliberate and premeditate on his acts 
... While one's mental condition may not excuse 
the act, it may nevertheless affect the degree of 
guilt" (P. 145). 
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Admittedly, the Green and Anselmo decisions 
concern themselves with other than felony murder 
cases, but the enunciated principle expressed is no 
less applicable to all offenses involving a specific intent 
as an essential element. It is of interest to note that 
approximately half of the nation's courts have adopted 
the partial responsibility doctrine urging the concept 
that a defendant may suffer from such a mental dis-
turbance that, while not excusing entirely, it will reduce 
the grade of the offense (See The Report of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, THE MENTALLY DIS-
ABLED AND THE LAW, 1961, pp. 355-7; Wei-
hofen, PARTIAL INSANITY AND CRIMINAL 
INTENT, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 505; W eihofen and Over-
holser, MENTAL DISORDER AFFECTING 
THE DEGREE OF CRIME, 56 Yale L. J. 959). 
The cases treating with the doctrine predominately have 
involved the reduction of first degree murder to second 
degree murder, but the underlying rationale would be 
"applicable to any crime calling for some 'specific 
intent' on the part of the accused ... " (The Report 
of the American Bar Foundation, MENTALLY 
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supraJ at 355; See 
also People v. Goshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P. 2d 492; 
Weihofen, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMI-
NAL OFFENSE, P. 176 (1954) ). 
The principle urged here, and previously applied 
by this Court, does not red1tee the responsibility for the 
greater crime, but implies fuU responsibility for the 
lesser crime (See Taylor, PARTIAL INSANITY 
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AS AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF CRIME-
A COMMENTARY ON FISHER V. U. S., 34 
Calif. L. Rev. 625 ( 1946) ) . 
In the New Jersey trial upon a felony murder 
charge the trial judge instructed that the accused should 
be acquitted of the charge if the jury found he was 
mentally incapable of forming an intent to commit 
the robbery out of which the killing arose (State v. 
Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249). 
C. FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
INSTRUCT UPON LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSES OF THE CRIME OF MURDER 
IN THE FIRST DEGREE WAS PREJUDI-
CIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Of course, where the evidence does not raise an 
issue of a lesser included offense the trial court need 
not give such instruction, but where there are different 
degrees of culpable homicide, depending upon the intent 
of the accused at the time .of the slaying, it is the duty 
of the court to instruct the jury upon appropriate 
lesser included offenses (State v. Mewhinney, snpra) 
and this duty devolves upon the trial court whether or 
not such lesser included offense instruction is expressly 
requested (26 Am. Jur., Homicide, § 554). 
In the instant case, and because of the bearing 
that the defendant's mental condition reasonably could 
have upon the intent requ.ired for the principal offense, 
17 
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murder in the second degree should have been presented 
to the jury as a possible alternative finding. It was 
altogether possible that the jury reached the result it 
did, though satisfied that the defendant suffered from 
some form of mental impairment which contributed to 
the commission of the crime but not having been prop-
erly instructed as to the degrees of responsibility 
failed to take such impairment into consideration (See 
generally in this regard, White, IN SANITY IN 
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1923), p. 633) ). 
Failure to instruct upon unpremeditated murder 
as a lesser included offense of a felony murder has been 
held to be error (People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 
155 N .E. 79). In the l(oerber case, the New York 
Court of Appeals stated: 
"His own evidence on the point need not be 
accepted as true even if uncontradicted. We may 
doubt whether the evidence of intoxication ad-
duced by this defendant would carry sufficient 
weight with an intelligent jury to affect its ver-
dict. It presented, however, a serious question, 
affecting a substantial right, which should not 
have been withheld from the consideration of the 
triers of fact. We cannot say that, with proper 
instruction, 'but one decision and that adverse 
to the defendant could reasonably have been 
reached.' When the alternative presented was 
conviction of murder in the first degree or acquit-
tal, a conscientious jury would scarcely bring 
itself to a verdict of not guilty in this case. If 
they had been instructed that other verdicts were 
permissible, they might or might not have found 
the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of felo-
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nious homicide. 'Ve therefore cannot overlook 
the failure of the court to give proper instruction, 
as we might if we could reach the conclusion 
that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to go 
to the jury that defendant was, in the only rele-
vant sense, too drunk to form the speci~~ intent 
for committing robbery" (p. 82-3). 
It makes no logical difference whether intoxication 
or mental condition impair the ability to form the spe-
cific intent (See Weihofen and Overholser, MENTAL 
DISORDER AFFECTING THE DEGREE 
OF A CRIME, supra, who make the following obser-
vation at page 962: "If the mental state requisite to a 
given crime is absent, the crime has not been committed. 
To what cause the absence of such mental state is to 
be attributed would seem immaterial. Intoxication 
is not a circumstance that excites any sympathy. Unless 
involuntary, it is no defense to criminal liability. Never-
theless, if it is proved that a defendant charged with 
a deliberate and premeditated killing was too drunk 
at the time to deliberate and premeditate, he cannot 
be convicted of first degree murder; he must be con-
victed, if at all, of some lesser degree of homicide, not 
because we countenance drunkenness as a mitigating 
circumstance, but because he did not commit the more 
serious crime'') . 
Where the facts reasonably raise an issue as to an 
element of the greater offense, and even when the 
greater offense involves the prosecution under statutes 
which declare that killing a human while engaged In 
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the perpetration of enumerated felonies shall be murder 
in the first degree, the court cannot usurp the right of 
the jury to consider a lesser offense by an imperative 
or binding instruction as was given here (26 Am. Jur., 
Homicide,§ 555, citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 28 
L.Ed. 262, 4 S.Ct. 202). 
In State v. Stenbach (September 21, 1931), 2 P.2d 
1050, 79 A.L.R. 878, the Supreme Court of Utah 
concluded in a homicide case where intoxication was in-
volved that " ... the ability to form a particular or 
specific intent may be lacking and yet there may be 
sufficient mental capacity to form an intention to do an 
act which results in death." 
When all of the competent evidence is viewed in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution, mental respon-
sibility, as it bears upon the specific intent essential to 
the crime charged, remains as a paramount issue of 
fact which should have been presented to the jury. The 
failure to give a reasonable alternative to the jury 
must be construed as substantial and material error. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT COULD 
ACQUIT THE DEFENDANT IF THEY 
FOUND THAT AT THE TIME OF THE OF-
:F'ENSE THE DEFENDANT WAS SUFFER-
ING FROM A DISEASED OR DEFECTIVE 
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l\lEN'rAL CONDITION, AND THAT THE 
l{ILLING WAS A PRODUCT OF SUCH MEN-
TAL ABNORMALITY C 0 N S TIT UTE D 
ERROR AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THEACCUSED. 
After advising the jury that the issue of "insanity" 
had been raised by the defendant, and that they could 
acquit him if his sanity was not proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the court defined the term "insane" as 
follows: 
"The term 'insane' as used in these instructions 
means such a perverted and deranged condition 
of a person's mental faculties as to render him 
either incapable of distinguishing between right 
and wrong, or incapable of knowing the nature 
of the act he is committing; and where he is con-
sciol!_s of the nature of the act he is committing 
and able to distinguish between right and wrong 
and knows that the act is wrong, yet his will, 
that is, the governing power of his mind, has 
been so completely destroyed that his actions are 
not subject to it, but are beyond his control. 
"Temporary insanity, as well as insanity of 
longer duration, is recognized by the law. 
"A mere lack of moral restraints leading to a 
surrender to criminal thoughts and actions is 
not in legal contemplation sufficient to find a 
person insane" ( T. 444) . 
Defense counsel excepted to the failure of the court 
to give the following instruction ( T. 480) : 
"If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant killed Karen Mechling, but 
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if you believe that at the time he was insane, in 
that he was suffering from a diseased or defective 
mental condition, and that the killing was a 
product of such mental abnormality, then it is 
your duty to acquit him of the crime charged" 
(R. 62). 
It has been suggested, and reasonably so, that when 
the doctrine of "partial responsibility" is applied, that 
the historical test of insanity as a complete defense, i.e., 
the right and wrong test (M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & 
F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)), and the irresistable 
impulse test (State v. Green, supra) must be sup-
planted (see Weihofen and Overholser, MENTAL 
DISORDER AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF 
A CRIME, supra~ at p. 978). 
The instant case presents to our court a perfect 
opportunity to reexamine the law of Utah as it relates 
to mental disorder and criminal responsibility. The 
quoted instruction, supra~ is a pot pourri of language 
which would confuse and mislead an intelligent jury. 
The hardship it works is manifest here, where an obvi-
ously deranged, ill and feeble-minded defendant must 
meet his Maker because the jury had no adequate, 
humane and lawful gauge to guide its determination. 
Nothing can be added here by placing upon the scale 
the vast plethora of decisions, legal articles and psychi-
atric papers which place the M~N aghten rule in dis-
repute (see Weihofen, THE URGE TO PUNISH, 
p. 60, et seq. ( 1956)). 
The M~N aghten rule has been criticized princi-
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pally for the reason that it places emphasis only upon 
the "cognitive" ability of the accused, ignoring the 
effect of the mental condition upon his "volition". Two 
recent developments have been illuminating in this 
area of mental responsibility, and give us hope that 
the courts will depart from the historic test and adopt 
a more realistic view. In United States v. Durham 
(D.C. Cir., 1954), 214 F. 2d 852, the court repudiated 
both the "right-and -wrong" and "irresistible impulse" 
tests, in favor of the "product" rule. Critical of both 
tests, Judge Bazelon observed: 
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the 
right-wrong test is inadequate in that (a) it does 
not take sufficient account of psychic realities 
and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based 
upon one symptom and so cannot validly be 
applied in all circumstances. We find that the 
"irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate in 
that it gives no recognition to mental illness 
characterized by brooding and reflection and so 
relegates acts caused by such illness to the appli-
cation of the inadequate right-wrong test. We 
conclude that a broader test should be adopted." 
The court thereafter fortnulated the test that it deemed 
more responsive to modern concepts of psychiatry and 
the law, concluding: 
"Whenever there is 'some evidence' that the 
accused suffered from a diseased or defective 
mental condition at the time the unlawful act was 
committed, the trial court must provide the jury 
with guides for determining whether the accused 
can be held criminally responsible. We do not, 
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and indeed could not formulate an instruction 
which would be either appropriate or binding in 
all cases. But under the rule now announced, 
any instruction should in some way convey to 
the jury the sense and SJlbstance of the follow-
ing: If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused was not suffering from 
a diseased or defective mental condition at the 
time he committed the criminal act charged, you 
may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffer-
ing from a diseased or defective mental condi-
tion when he committed the act_, but believe be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the act was not 
the prod'ltet of S'uch mental abnormality_, you may 
find him guilty. Unless you believe ,beyond a 
reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering 
from a diseased or defective mental condition_, 
or that the act was not the product of such abnor-
mality_, you must find the accused not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Thus your task would not be 
completed upon finding, if you did find, that the 
accused suffered from a mental disease or defect. 
He would still be responsible for his unlawful 
act if there was no causal connection between 
such mental abnormality and the act. These 
questions must be determined by you from the 
facts which you find to be fairly deducible from 
the testimony and the evidence in this case." 
(Italics supplied) . 
The other recent development which has given 
impetus to an enlightened approach to the relationship 
between mental condition and criminal responsibility 
is the Model Penal Code which has been so carefully 
drafted by the American Law Institute. The following 
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" Aperson is not responsible for criminal con-
duct if at the time of such conduct as a result 
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirement of law" (American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, Sec. 
4.01 (1955)). 
By either test it is apparent that a substantial im-
provement has been worked upon the law, as words such 
as "right," "wrong," "knowing," and "irresistible im-
pulse" have been discarded. Indeed, as recently as 1958, 
our Supreme Court has been obliged to squirm through 
the semantic maze of distinguishing "or" and "and" 
(State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859). 
In the case at bar, the jury could acquit if they 
could find that the defendant could not distinguish 
between "right and wrong." No endeavor is made to 
supply a definition of "wrong," and the jury is left to 
indulge its own imagination as to the concept. Both 
the views advocated in Durham and in the Model Code 
supply much simpler tests. Durham would ask the 
jury if the crime was the "product" of a mental disease 
or defect, whereas the Model Code would abandon the 
word "wrong" and substitute "criminality." The jury 
here might well have asked itself, "What does the judge 
mean by 'wrong,' does it mean "morally wrong," or 
"contrary to law," or both?" The instruction requested 
by defense counsel would place all of these ambiguities 
~ at rest, and give to the jury an adequate and modern 
~ test to guide its determinations. 
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For 90 years New Hampshire has rejected the 
right-and-wrong test, adopting instead the view that 
the question of the existence of insanity as a total 
defense presents a question to the jury not resolvable 
by any particular test (State v. Pike (1870) 49 N.H. 
399, 6 Am. Rep. 533; State v. Jones (1870) 50 N.H. 
369, 9 Am. Rep. 242). In 1953, an English Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended 
abandoning the M'Naghten rule in favor of a rule 
which would permit the jury to determine whether at 
the time of the act the accused was suffering from 
disease of the mind or mental deficiency to such a 
degree that he could not be held responsible. The Com-
mission reported: 
"The gravamen of the charge against the 
M'Naghten Rules is that they are not in har-
mony with modern medical science, which, as we 
have seen, is reluctant to divide the mind into 
separate compartments-the intellect, the emo-
tions and the will-but looks at it as a whole and 
considers that insanity distorts and impairs the 
action of the mind as a whole." 
As a practical matter, Durham, and the New 
Hampshire rule releases the expert witness from the 
straight-jacket which confines his testimony to matters 
relevant to "right-and-wrong." For a collection of 
authorities approving this approach see Roche, Crimi-
nality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 
22 U. OF CHI. L. 'REV. 320; Zilboorg, A. Step To-
ward Enlightened Ju.stice, 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 
331; Guthnacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Wit-
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nessJ 22 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 325; E. De Grazia, 
The Distinction of Being ltiadJ 22 U. OF CHI. L. 
REV. 339; Guttmacher and W eihofen, Psychiatry and 
the Law (1952); Sobeloff, llrom MJNaghten to Dur-
hamJ and Beyond-A Disct~;ssion of Insanity and the 
Criminal LawJ 41 A.B.A.J. 793; and collected law re-
view articles and notes in Annotation, 45 A.L.R. 2d 
1447, at 1463. 
It is hoped that our courts can be released from 
the mire of confusion which prompts so many different 
instructions. The trial court in the instant case reflects 
a sincere desire to ride every horse in the field of menta] 
responsibility, and the result is that none is thoroughly 
presented nor correctly handled. To remove from the 
consideration of the jury the right-and-wrong test 
would enable it to consider all of the evidence reflecting 
upon· the defendant's mental condition at the time of 
the act, including evidence of feeble-mindedness, and 
emotional and character disorders. Moreover, the ab-
sence of apparent impulsive conduct would not preclude 
the jury from drawing legal "insanity" from an act 
which given the appearance of being "coolly and care-
fully prepared" (Royal Commission on Capital Pun-
ishment, supraJ Report 110-111 (1953)). 
POINT III 
THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR 
WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTAN-
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TIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT IN 
THAT IT WAS HIGHLY IMPROPER AND 
WAS CALCULATED TO INFLAME THE 
MINDS OF THE JURY. 
The summation of the prosecution's case was pre-
sented by all three prosecuting attorneys. The first of 
these arguments was presented by an assistant District 
Attorney who resided in the same town as the victim. 
The following remarks were made by Mr. Ivins: 
"Therefore, I feel it would be of no value to 
you as jurors for me to talk to you about guilt 
or innocence, because this fact has been estab-
lished and admitted by the defendant, himself. 
The District Attorney's Office, County Attor-
ney's Office, the Sheriff's Office have never 
throughout the course of preparing this case or 
trying it ever had any doubts that we had the 
right defendant; we were trying the right man" 
(T. 451). 
* * * * 
"I personally, perhaps, have become more 
emotionallly involved in this matter than some 
of my col~~agues. The offense, itself, was com-
mitted within a few blocks of my home in Ameri-
can Fork. I was acquainted with many of the 
participants. I have become acquainted with the 
family since the incident occurred. I know the 
horrible impact that the incident had on the citi-
zenry of American Fork. I know how they re-
acted in horror and sadness, and I know how my 
own children come from from school emotionally 
disturbed and upset because of this hideous hor-
rible thing that had happened. And you can't 
explain to a child why it happens; it's impossible 
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to explain. For that reason, perhaps, I am closer 
to the em<?tjonal involvement of this thing than 
many others who are present here" ( T. 452-3) . 
* * * * 
"Of course, the person who was the victim of 
this terrible deed is not present; is unable to be 
present. ~ o.t only did this young girl-not only 
was she deprived of her right to live out a full 
and complete life by the horrible act of this 
defendant, but she was-her body was subjected 
to the indignities of an autopsy. The memory of 
this gir 1 has been considered tainted by the hor-
rible deed and act that was done. The family 
has been subjected to humiliation and indignities 
beyond expression because of the publicity which 
has been nation-wide, which has been given to 
this crime. Never will we know the heartbreak 
and sadness that has been caused to the family 
by this horrible deed that was perpetrated by 
Mr. Poulson. For no reason, a senseless act for 
one purpose only, to satisfy his own lust, to kill 
a 11 year old girl. There is no more horrible deed 
could have been committed against society than 
the one that Mr. Poulson committed; no more 
horrible deed than-that I can even conjecture, 
think of, 1Je,cause of the attack upon an innocent 
11 year old girl. It is horrible to contemplate" 
(T. 453). 
It is submitted that the foregoing portions of 
counsel's argument were highly inflammatory and 
prejudicial to defendant. This argument endeavors to 
suggest that the case would not have been prosecuted 
unless the "District Attorney's Office, County Attor-
ney's Office, the Sheriff's Office" were satisfied that 
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the defendant was guilty. This implies a belief based 
upon the judgment of the respective offices, rather than 
the evidence produced at the trial, that the defendant 
was guilty. Such conduct is manifestly prejudical to 
the defendant (People v. Beal, 116 Cal. App. 2d 475, 
254 P. 2d 100; People v. Hoffman, 399 Ill. 57, 77 N.E. 
2d 195; State v. Susan, 152 Wash. 365, 278 P. 149). 
A fair and impartial analysis of the evidence could 
hardly embrace references by counsel to his personal 
familiarity with the facts of the killing, nor gratuitous 
suggestions that his own children were "emotionally 
disturbed and upset because of this hideous, horrible 
thing that had happened." Such an argument is grossly 
improper and could only have been intended to excite 
the prejudices and passions of the jury against the 
defendant. 
The remarks of the P,rosecutor are all the more 
prejudicial in the light of the crin1e itself, which was 
especially abhorrent, and would easily produce the 
result intended by counsel. The remarks would tend 
to detract the minds of the jury from the evidence, sup-
planting therefor the base appeal for prejudice and 
passion (State v. Goodwin (Mo., 1919) 217 S.W. 264). 
In their totality, the prosecutors' statements were 
clearly intended to frighten the jury into a conclusion 
consistent with its finding. Under, these circumstances, 
the argument is highly prejudicial and constitutes rever-
sible error. That counsel for the defendant fail~d to 
interpose an objection to the argument does not con-
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stitute a waiver of this improper conduct, especially 
where the life of the defendant is at stake. See Anno-
tation, 50 A.L.R. 2d 766. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully concluded that the trial court 
committed error of a nature that was prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the defendant. The instruction 
to the jury confining the alternative findings to guilty 
of murder in the first degree or not guilty wholly failed 
to present the proper alternative lesser included of-
fenses where the issue of mental responsibility was so 
dominant. 
The instructions themselves relating to "insanity" 
were ambiguous and confusing serving as no useful 
guide to appraise the evidence bearing upon the mental 
condition of the defendant. 
Finally, the argument of the prosecutor was grossly 
improper, bringing into the trial matters far beyond 
the competent and admissible evidence. The argument 
was an appeal to prejudice, emotion and passion, was 
in extremely poor taste, and had the desired effect of 
encouraging the finding of guilty. 
No greater responsibility rests upon the shoulders 
of a trial court than to insure to a defendant on trial 
for his life a fair and impartial consideration of all the 
evidence, and where the punishment imposed cannot 
be undone, it behooves the court to resolve all disputed 
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issues of law in favor of the defendant. The gravity of 
capital punishment has an important bearing where 
mental responsibility is the predominant issue, and to 
send to death a young man with a mental age half his 
physical age, and having real and substantial evidence 
of mental disease and derangement, is to walk blindly 
against the enlightened body of modern law which gives 
meaning and import to such a condition. To ignore the 
effect of such a condition upon the intent essential to 
the principal offense, is to refuse to keep step with the 
development of well-reasoned .law. 
Accordingly, we respectfully urge that this Honor-
able Court reverse the finding of guilty and direct a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM G. FOWLER 
1101 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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